Open Source Encryption Software
Encryption is only as trustworthy as your ability to verify the implementation and keep control of the keys, and a closed tool asks you to take both on faith - the one thing you cannot afford when the data is genuinely sensitive. This category runs from full-disk and file encryption to cloud-storage vaults, secrets managers, and encrypted password stores, which protect against very different failures: a stolen laptop, a curious file host, a rogue admin, a leaked backup. Open source lets you read exactly how data is sealed and where keys live, so the recovery path stays in your hands and nothing depends on a company still existing years from now, when you may still need to open a file you encrypted today.
HashiCorp Vault
Secrets management, encryption as a service, and privileged access management
KeePassXC
Offline, encrypted password manager that stores your vault in a local KDBX file you control
age
Simple file encryption with small explicit keys, post-quantum support, and UNIX-style composability
SOPS
Editor for encrypted YAML, JSON, ENV, INI, and binary files with KMS, age, and PGP
Cryptomator
Client-side cloud encryption that keeps files private before they reach Dropbox, Google Drive, OneDrive, and more
KeeWeb
Browser and desktop password manager that opens and creates KeePass kdbx vaults
VeraCrypt
Open source disk encryption for Windows, macOS, Linux, and FreeBSD with plausible deniability
Sealed Secrets
Kubernetes controller and kubeseal tool for one-way encrypted Secrets
gopass
GPG-encrypted, git-versioned password manager for teams - a drop-in replacement for the standard UNIX pass
Our picks
Pick by what you are protecting - a file, a cloud folder, a whole disk, or a repo full of secrets.
Modern file encryption: age age encrypts files with small explicit keys, no config, and UNIX-style piping, so it drops into scripts like any shell tool. You can encrypt to several recipients at once, protect a file with a passphrase, or lock it to an SSH key, and hybrid post-quantum keys guard against future attacks. Fewer options mean fewer ways to hold it wrong.
Encrypt cloud-synced files: Cryptomator Cryptomator encrypts files on your device before they sync, so Dropbox, Google Drive, OneDrive, and similar services store only ciphertext. You unlock a vault and work through a virtual drive as if it were a USB stick, with filenames encrypted and folder structure obscured, using AES-256 with scrypt key derivation.
Full-disk and volume encryption: VeraCrypt VeraCrypt protects data at the disk level rather than file by file, building on TrueCrypt 7.1a with added security work. It runs on Windows, macOS, Linux, and FreeBSD, offers graphical, text-mode, and console-only interfaces for headless servers, and ships EFI boot loader binaries so it can encrypt the system boot volume itself.
Secrets in version control: SOPS SOPS encrypts the values inside YAML, JSON, ENV, INI, and binary files while leaving structure and keys readable, so secrets can live in the same git repository as the code that uses them. It supports AWS, GCP, and Azure KMS plus age and PGP, keeping data in storage you already control.
What must stay unreadable, and after which failure
Name the failure you are defending against first, because the categories here are not interchangeable. A stolen, powered-off laptop calls for full-disk encryption like VeraCrypt or a LUKS-based tool such as Tomb or zuluCrypt; a file that must stay sealed after it leaves your machine calls for file encryption like age, GnuPG, or Kryptor; a folder synced to a cloud provider calls for client-side encryption like Cryptomator, gocryptfs, or CryFS, which encrypt before anything reaches the server. Full-disk protects a machine at rest but not a synced file after login, so stacking layers without a clear boundary just multiplies prompts and confuses recovery.
Treat key management as the product rather than a checkbox, because a strong cipher does not save a lost recovery key or a sharing model that trains people to paste secrets into chat. Team tools raise this sharply: Passbolt and Padloc use end-to-end encryption with user-owned keys so the server never holds the means to read data, which is safer but means you must plan recovery before a crisis. For infrastructure secrets, Vault, OpenBao, and SOPS separate who can decrypt from where the ciphertext lives. Decide who is allowed to reset access and exactly what that person can decrypt.
Finally, favor tools that make their format and metadata behavior explicit. You want to know whether filenames, folder structure, sizes, and timestamps are protected or only the content bytes - CryFS hides directory structure and file sizes, while simpler file tools protect content alone. Standard, documented formats such as OpenPGP or the KDBX vault behind KeePassXC and KeeWeb make long-term access and migration safer than an opaque store you cannot open elsewhere. Check how releases are signed and whether there is a scriptable path for batch encryption and restore drills, not just a GUI.
Related categories
Frequently asked questions
Do I need file encryption or full-disk encryption?+
They defend different moments. Full-disk encryption like VeraCrypt protects a lost, powered-off device but not a file once you have logged in and unlocked it. File or container encryption like age or Picocrypt NG travels with the document, so it stays sealed when copied or uploaded, at the cost of key sharing and versioning. Many people need both layers, but keep the boundary clear so recovery does not become a maze of prompts.
How should key recovery work if a password is forgotten?+
Decide it before rollout, because the answer defines who can decrypt your data. Personal tools lean on printed recovery keys or a hardware token; team systems use escrow, split recovery, or an admin-assisted reset. A reset that silently grants someone access is a security event, not a convenience. Whatever you choose, test recovery with throwaway data and store the recovery material apart from the encrypted files themselves.
Does an independent security audit matter for encryption tools?+
Yes, but read what it covered. A review of the interface is not the same as analysis of the cryptographic design, key derivation, random-number use, and file-format parsing. Because encryption tools are prime supply-chain targets, also check how releases are signed and how disclosed issues were handled. Passbolt publishes audit findings and KeePassXC's format is widely scrutinized; a public, scoped report beats a vague claim of being audited.
What separates the password managers from the secrets managers here?+
Audience and workflow. Password managers like KeePassXC, KeeWeb, and Passbolt store human credentials - logins, TOTP codes, notes - for people to retrieve. Secrets managers like Vault, OpenBao, SOPS, and Sealed Secrets store machine credentials - API keys, database passwords, certificates - for applications and pipelines, with leasing, rotation, and revocation. gopass sits between them, keeping human-managed secrets in GPG-encrypted files versioned in git.
Does the tool protect metadata or only the file contents?+
This varies more than people expect, and it matters. Simple file encryption seals the content bytes but can leave filenames, sizes, and timestamps visible. Cryptomator encrypts filenames and obscures folder structure, and CryFS goes further by hiding file sizes and directory layout so a cloud host sees only opaque blocks. If an observer learning your folder names or file sizes is part of your threat model, confirm metadata handling before you commit.
What happens if an encryption project stops being maintained?+
Source code alone does not guarantee a safe exit. You need buildable releases, documented formats, working export, and dependencies you can still obtain. The practical hedge is to keep a migration sample in your own records: a few encrypted test files, the keys, the recovery material, and notes on decrypting them on a clean machine. Standard formats like OpenPGP or KDBX help, because another implementation can usually still read them.
What should teams check before sharing encrypted data?+
Look closely at recipient management: how you add a user, remove one, rotate keys, and reason about which old files a departed member can still decrypt, since permission changes are not always retroactive. Passbolt and Padloc are built around per-user keys and access policies for exactly this, and age lets you encrypt one file to several recipients. Without a real model, team encryption decays into manual key passing that breaks at the first staff change.